Replication Data for: How do people evaluate foreign aid to “nasty" regimes?

Recent theories of foreign aid assume that moral motives drive voters’ preferences over foreign aid. However, there is little knowledge how moral concerns interact with the widely accepted instrumental goals that aid serves. Moreover, what effects do such interplay have on preferences over policy actions? In this article, we assess these questions using a novel survey experiment in which respondents evaluate foreign aid policies toward nasty recipient regimes (those that torture, rig elections, etc.). The results indicate that the public does have a strong aversion for providing aid to nasty recipient regimes, but it is also appreciative of the instrumental benefits that aid acquires. Interestingly, contrary to a mainstay assertion in the literature, we find that moral aversion can be reversed to a great extent when the donor government engages more with the nasty country. These findings not only bring into question the micro-foundations of recent theories of foreign aid, but also produce a slew of implications for the aid literature